

2. An American Perspective on the UK Financial Services Authority: Politics, Goals, and Regulatory Intensity

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Introduction

In much comparative corporate law scholarship, the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) are considered to be of one piece. Particularly in the area of capital markets, the “Anglo-American” approach to regulation is typically contrasted to continental or civil law systems. With their shared traditions of laissez-faire capitalism, common-law jurisprudence, self-regulatory organizations, and disclosure-based securities regulation, the United States and the United Kingdom are often portrayed as fellow travelers in the world of financial regulation. Indeed, in formal empirical work on the subject, the two countries commonly occupy the same dummy variable.¹

In terms of organizational structure, however, the U.S. and UK systems of financial regulation could not be farther apart. Our system is the most decentralized and fragmented in the world; theirs is now among the most centralized and integrated. Ours is the product of centuries of bureaucratic accretions, with every generation adding new administrative units and regulatory requirements while seldom if ever abandoning innovations of the past. Theirs is the precocious child of Labour Party reforms of the late 1990s, as unlike the old clubby ways of the City as the Canary Wharf towers are from the East End tenements they replaced.

So the puzzle arises: How can two countries that are shoulder to shoulder on the substance stand so far apart when it comes to matters of form? In this essay, I identify several different factors that have contributed to the substantial divergence in U.S. and UK regulatory structures. I focus my attention on three reasons why the United Kingdom has developed such a markedly different system of financial regulation than the one that exists on this side of the Atlantic. First, I consider difference in the political context in which both countries undertook financial reform in the late 1990s; second, I note differences in the national objectives for financial regulation in the two countries; and finally I highlight differences in the intensity of regulatory oversight in the two countries. All three of these considerations contribute, I believe, to the very substantial difference in regulatory structure that separates the United States and the United Kingdom.

While this essay limits its analysis to the regulatory structures in two jurisdictions, its implications are substantially broader. The premise of my analysis is that regulatory structures within individual countries are a product of numerous considerations that are likely to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The structure and priorities of domestic political institutions as well as the goals of financial regulation within individual countries can factor heavily into the evolution of regulation structures, as the British and American experiences illustrate. These factors also influence the scale and intensity of financial regulation, which themselves may affect the likelihood that particular jurisdictions will pursue certain regulatory strategies, such as consolidation of regulatory functions. So, while there are many benefits to be gained from international comparisons of regulatory design and structure, there are numerous and entirely legitimate constraints on the harmonization of regulatory structures, at least in the short and intermediate term.

The Political Economy of Financial Reform

As several recent papers have chronicled, the path to the establishment of the Financial Services Administration has been long and arduous, dating back to election of the new Labour government in the spring of 1997.² At roughly the same time, the United States was also engaged in its own process of financial modernization, culminating in the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in November of 1999.³ What is striking about these two roughly contemporaneous legislative efforts is how different was the scope of the regulatory reforms attempted. A major achievement of British financial modernization was the consolidation and centralization of regulatory power into a unified Financial Services Authority (FSA). To some degree, this process represented a continuation of efforts begun in the 1980s to move away from the self-regulatory model that had characterized British supervision for more than a decade. But the singular achievement of the legislative process that culminated in the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) of 2000 was the consolidation of nearly a dozen supervisory units in a new organization with responsibility for nearly all sectors of the financial services industry.⁴

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, in contrast, was almost devoid of bureaucratic rationalization or reform, even though the U.S. system of financial regulation is even more decentralized and fragmented than the traditional British system. At various points in years leading up to the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Clinton administration officials floated some relatively modest suggestions for consolidating depository insurance funds or creating a new high-level council of senior regulatory officials to resolve thorny jurisdictional issues, but even these limited proposals generated intense political opposition and were quickly dropped from legisla-

tive proposals.⁵ In the end, the legislation limited itself to a relatively narrow range of issues, principally clarifying the scope of permissible fiscal activities for financial conglomerates and establishing modest protections for the security of consumer privacy in financial matters. In terms of organizational changes, the legislation did not eliminate a single regulatory agency; indeed, it set in motion a process that might have created a new regulatory body for the oversight of insurance agents.⁶

So the question arises: Why is it that reform efforts in the United Kingdom in the latter half of the 1990s led to substantial regulatory consolidation there, while contemporaneous reform efforts in the United States led to no similar developments? While many considerations undoubtedly contributed to this difference, I would note four contributing factors: (1) the parliamentary system of government, (2) the acquiescence of muddling through, (3) the role of European institutions, and (4) local political considerations.⁷

Parliamentary System of Government

From an American perspective, one of the most striking features of reform in the United Kingdom was the ability of the Labour government to control the terms of the reform debate, proposing an initial reform bill, maintaining control over the course of floor debate and amendments, and reaching a relatively prompt resolution within a relatively few years. When the Clinton administration joined the debate, it was entering a process that had been underway for more than ten years.⁸ Although the Treasury Department under the leadership of Secretary Robert Rubin ultimately developed statutory language for congressional consideration, the bill that became the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was largely the product of legislative processes to which the executive branch made regular contributions but over which it could not exert meaningful leadership, beyond a veto threat for a limited number of provisions. In the area of structural reform, political forces were particularly resistant to reform proposals, and in a number of areas where jurisdictional conflicts were especially acute, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act demurred by calling on the courts to resolve future conflicts.⁹ To be sure, reform proposals in the late 1990s in the United States were complicated by the presence of a divided government—the Republican Party then controlled both the House and the Senate—as well as the added complexities of a presidential impeachment, but it is hard to imagine any American administration, even with both houses of Congress in friendly hands, proposing so sweeping a program of governmental reform in the field of financial services and then seeing the proposal to successful adoption in only a handful of years.

A variety of factors contribute to difficulties that any American executive faces in proposing and gaining legislative support for structural changes in regulatory reform. The highly decentralized structure of tradi-

tional financial regulation in the United States creates numerous constituencies inclined to resist any efforts to make major changes in regulatory structures. These likely opponents for reform include not just participants in the financial services sector who may be disadvantaged from structural changes, but also their trade groups, regulatory officials, and even congressional representatives, all of whom may fear that movement from the status quo may cost them status or employment. One often-cited example of this phenomenon is the opposition that members of the congressional agricultural committees typically voice in the face of proposals to consolidate the regulation of derivatives and securities in the United States, as the consolidated agencies would almost certainly be located under the control of the congressional committees focusing on financial services.

Of course, the American opposition to regulatory consolidation is not based solely on the self-interest of affected parties. One of the reasons that entrenched interests can mount effective challenges to regulatory reforms is that there is a strong historical bias against consolidated power at the national level. Division of power between national authorities and state officials as well as separation of powers at the federal level is a hallmark of the U.S. regulatory system. In defending the status quo, opponents of regulatory reform in the United States can tap into heart-felt themes of American political thought that date back to the earliest years of the republic. This bias against consolidated governmental power partially explains why American administrations have had so little success in consolidating regulatory functions in the United States, at a time when their counterparts—and in particular their counterparts in the United Kingdom—have been so much more successful.

Acquiescence of Muddling Through

Another characteristically un-American feature of the British reform effort was the highly ad-hoc manner in which the reforms proceeded. The Financial Services Authority was established before its formal powers were fully enacted.¹⁰ For its first few years of operation, the agency assumed supervisory functions delegated from other governmental units. Personnel from other agencies were routinely seconded to FSA offices, and gradually the staff of numerous agencies were merged into the FSA's own ranks of personnel. While this informal interregnum allowed the FSA staff a chance to grow into its powers and shape its ultimate legislative mandate, it is hard to imagine reform efforts proceeding in precisely the same consensual manner in the United States.¹¹ With so much regulatory power shifting hands and various oxen inevitably being gored at least in passing, one expects that a comparable exercise in the United States would have unleashed a barrage of lawsuits claiming deviations from statutory grants of power or violations of separation of powers principles.¹² While the

American aversion to unauthorized exercise of governmental authority has its virtues, the litigiousness and combativeness through which this sensibility is often expressed makes informal regulatory accommodation of the sort employed in the early years of the FSA difficult to achieve in the United States and seldom a major feature of our reform proposals.¹³ Rather the tendency is to try to spell out all of the details of reform efforts at the outset, thereby clarifying their statutory basis but also presenting juicy targets at which potential opponents can take aim.¹⁴

A connection exists, I think, between the British willingness to muddle through and its system's ability to avoid the sort of political logjams that characterize U.S. reform efforts. In my mind, a good example of this connection was the FSA's approach to personnel issues. As mentioned above, in the United States, a natural source of resistance to regulatory reforms has been regulators themselves who may reasonably fear that consolidation of regulatory functions will eliminate their positions or at least diminish prospects for advancements, thereby stimulating the sort of bureaucratic in-fighting that can derail the legislative process. To ameliorate resistance of this sort, the framers of the FSA process guaranteed continuity of employment for all regulatory personnel over the course of the consolidation process. Although a relatively minor feature of a major legislative agenda, this attention to individual concerns may have smoothed the reform process, albeit at the expense of recognizing economies of scale in the short term.¹⁵

While the Gramm-Leach-Bliley reform process never contemplated substantial consolidation of regulatory functions, it did include provisions designed to create uniformity of interpretations between the principal federal banking agencies: the comptroller of the currency and the Federal Reserve Board. Rather than leaving these interpretive issues to informal processes, the legislative process necessitates complex and multifaceted negotiations between the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board, culminating in a complex set of statutory provisions defining extremely precise scopes of authority with mandatory consultations and procedures for judicial review.¹⁶ Far from muddling through, these provisions reflect a strongly legalistic and stylized approach to lawmaking in the financial services industry. Similar forms of cooperation were also specified for banking regulators and state insurance supervisors, and apparently the resulting framework has proved workable for the industry.¹⁷ These ad hoc accommodations are, however, unlikely to promote the evolution of significant changes in regulatory design.

Role of European Institutions

A further distinguishing feature of the political economy of the United Kingdom is the influence of the European Union and other European legal structures. While not prominently featured in many accounts of the birth

of the Financial Services Authority, developments on the Continent played an important role in the emergence of the agency. For one thing, a number of European Union directives required member states such as the United Kingdom to make certain reforms in their regulatory structure. For example, certain directives in the field of securities regulation called for the movement of certain regulatory functions out of self-regulatory organizations, such as the London Stock Exchange, and into governmental agencies. Moreover, the total volume of European Union directives in the field of financial regulation required British regulators to assume tasks and meet formal standards well beyond those traditionally assumed. While the old decentralized regulatory structure could have been adapted to meet these multilateral commitments, the presence of these new requirements contributed, in my view, to the national consensus in the late 1990s that full-fledged reform of the UK regulatory structures was in order. To a certain degree, this sentiment may have been enhanced by concerns that financial innovations on the Continent—both the rapid growth of stock markets in France and Germany plus the emergence of a Eurozone in which the United Kingdom was not to be a member—contributed to a climate conducive of decisive action in the field of financial reform.¹⁸

For U.S. reform efforts, there is no ready analog to the European Union. To a certain degree, NAFTA and to a lesser extent the WTO have had the effect of opening U.S. financial services markets to foreign firms, but these trade agreements have not required domestic reforms of the sort that, for example, the Financial Services Action Plan has had on the United Kingdom and other member states. In many instances, of course, U.S. regulatory requirements have informed the development of international standards, enunciated through organizations such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision or the International Organization of Securities Commissioners. But in these cases, the United States was generally exporting its regulatory requirements, not bringing itself in alignment with externally developed standards. Moreover, where multilateral agreements have presupposed domestic regulatory reforms in the financial services industry, the United States has—at least of late—shown dogged reluctance to conform to the expectations of counterparties. In the past year, the best example of this tendency would be the announcement that federal banking officials would impose extensively reformed provisions of the Basel Capital Accord. So, as a matter of experience and predilection, the evolution of external regulatory standards has not been a major factor in forcing regulatory reforms in the United States.

Local Political Considerations

Last and not least are significant differences in the local political dynamics. When the Blair government came to power in 1997, British consumers had suffered through a series of domestic scandals, ranging from widely publi-

cized abuses in the sale of pensions to the spectacular failures of Barings and the Maxwell interests. Reformers could and did capitalize on these issues to expose perceived weaknesses in traditional regulatory systems and to justify far-reaching regulatory reforms such as the FSMA. By the late 1990s in the United States, by contrast, outrage over our then most recent financial scandal—the savings and loan crisis—had largely faded, and the country had enjoyed several years of record-high stock prices and record-low bank failure rates. Aside from concerns of financial privacy that overtook the legislative process in mid-1999, the politics of financial modernization in the United States was fairly low-key. The most zealous advocates for reform were members of the financial services industry seeking to eliminate long-standing but already partially eviscerated activities restrictions. The substantially higher level of public interest in financial regulation in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s helped propel the United Kingdom to much more substantial regulatory reforms than would have been feasible in the United States.

Since the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, of course, the United States has encountered major financial scandals, including the bursting of the technology stock bubble in 2000, coupled with corporate accounting scandals and securities industry abuses uncovered in the next few years, as well as more recent scandals of the mutual fund industry and New York Stock Exchange compensation arrangements. Major legislation in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ensued, with much fanfare and substantial implications for corporations in the United States and around the world. The reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, did not address regulatory consolidation or simplification. Indeed, the only structure reform of the act was to add a new regulatory in its creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. While difficulties at the NYSE have prompted some to call for a reduction in our reliance on self-regulatory organizations, no specific reform proposals have been adopted, and at least for the time being, prospects for such changes seem unlikely.

While one must be circumspect in locating differences in national regulatory strategies in any single factor or set of factors, the substantial differences in the regulatory scope of the FSMA and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act at roughly the same time does invite speculation as to the reasons for those differences. In my mind, striking points of difference were the capacity of the new Blair government to utilize a strong parliamentary majority to effect the changes; the flexibility of the British system of government to allow such a large-scale legislative reform to be worked out in a pragmatic but substantially more informal process than the United States political system would have allowed; pressures from political developments at the European Union level that necessitated a variety of reforms at the domestic level; and recent political developments that created some degree of public support for regulatory reforms included in the FSMA.

A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Objectives

Another explanation for the differences in U.S. and UK regulatory structure is a substantial divergence between the objectives of regulatory structures in the two countries. As explained below, the United States has an ambitious set of goals for its financial regulators. The British objectives are on balance more modest and in certain critical respects better suited for a consolidated supervisory apparatus.

Regulatory Objectives in the United States

As I have written at length elsewhere, the United States has a broad set of regulatory goals for its financial regulators.¹⁹ While the importance of these goals varies somewhat from sector to sector within our financial services industry, the four following categories reflect our dominant regulatory priorities.

1. *Protection of depositors, policyholders, and investors.* First and foremost, our financial regulatory structure is designed to protect consumers from losses and abusive practices. In some contexts—including bank deposits of less than \$100,000 and certain pension plans—the protection we afford is absolute. Elsewhere (e.g., in the field of securities regulation), we impose significant restrictions on the terms of permissible competition and mandate the disclosure of large amounts of information, both to promote consumer self-help and to secure the protection of market forces. Much financial regulation in the United States serves the goal of consumer protection.
2. *Reduction of externalities.* A separate justification of financial regulation in the United States is the elimination of various externalities associated with financial failures. The Federal Reserve Board's lender of last resort function serves this purpose, as does the oft-maligned but still extant too-big-to-fail policy of federal banking regulators. The extent to which financial regulators should impose regulatory restraints out of concern for externalities is controversial, but there is little doubt that one of the reasons we regulate financial intermediaries in the United States is to prevent potential losses to parties that are not indirect contractual privity with intermediaries.
3. *Redistributive policies and other equitable norms.* A third and less well publicized goal of financial regulation in the United States is to advance various redistributive policies and other equitable norms. A good example of this phenomenon is the Community Reinvestment Act for depository institutions, but analogs also exist in the insurance industry and, to a limited extent, in the securities field. In many respects, we see our financial intermediaries as vehicles to implement a range of social policies, and financial regulators often find themselves agents in advancing these goals. Insurance regulators, for example, must often opine on whether it is permissible for

the price of car insurance to vary based on the gender or educational level of drivers, and pension officials must decide whether lower-income workers receive an equitable share of retirement benefits.

4. *Considerations of political economy.* Finally, broader considerations of political economy routine factor into our system of financial regulation. Perhaps the best example of this practice has been our historic aversion to nationwide banking, which still influences a profound effect on our banking system. In addition, political preferences for state control explain the persistence of state control over the insurance industry and overlapping state and federal jurisdiction in both banking and securities. Moreover, one might well attribute the fragmentation of supervisory control at the federal level to a national taste for separation of powers dating back to the early years of the republic.

Regulatory Objectives in the United Kingdom

In defining the regulatory goals of financial regulation in the United Kingdom, we are fortunate that Parliament went to considerable lengths in the enactment of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 to articulate a series of four statutory objectives, as well as six principles of good regulation. I will first review these regulatory goals and then contrast them with the goals of financial regulation in the United States.

Statutory Objectives

The Financial Services and Markets Act set out of the FSA four statutory objectives: market confidence, public awareness, consumer protection, and reduction of financial crime.²⁰

1. *Market confidence.* Market confidence relates to the preservation of both financial stability and the reasonable expectation that the financial system will remain stable. Its maintenance is supposed to provide market participants and consumers with the relevant incentives to trade in financial markets and use the services of financial institutions. According to the FSA, achieving market confidence involves the imposition of two steps: (a) to prevent material damage to the soundness of the UK financial system caused by the conduct—or collapse—of firms, markets, or financial infrastructure, and (b) to explain on what basis confidence in the UK financial system is justified. The latter includes stating explicitly what the regulator can and cannot achieve.²¹
2. *Public awareness.* With the enactment of the FSMA, the FSA was also given a specific objective in the area of consumer education. Reflecting a concern that consumers are not always in a position to judge the safety and soundness of particular financial institutions or to assess the risks associated with certain products,²² the act requires the FSA to pursue two main aims under the objective of

public awareness: (a) to improve general financial literacy, and (b) to improve the information and advice available to consumers.²³ The FSA not only provides generic information and advice to consumers, but also it encourages others to improve the availability and quality of their advice. In doing so, the FSA has developed a system of information and inquiry services, which includes the statutory register of authorized firms and the Consumer Helpline. To enhance public awareness about financial services, the FSA has developed partnerships with regulated business, trade associations, consumer groups, and educational institutions.

3. *Consumer protection.* Public awareness is closely interlinked with the objective of consumer protection. The FSMA charges the FSA with the task of “providing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers.” The legislation envisages that the prime responsibility for dealing fairly with consumers rests with the management of regulated firms. So the FSA’s regulatory approach is designed to focus and reinforce that responsibility, emphasizing the robustness of firms’ systems for identifying, measuring, and controlling risks both to the firm itself and to its customers. To this end, the FSA has also put in place mechanisms for complaints handling and redress that offer greater simplicity and ease of access to consumers. As required by the FSMA, a single financial services ombudsman scheme and a unified compensation scheme have been introduced, with a range of mechanisms for different markets and types of customers.²⁴
4. *Financial crime.* On the grounds that market confidence and consumer protection are significantly undermined if the financial system is not adequately protected from criminal abuses, the FSA is also obliged to reduce the extent to which it is possible for regulated institutions to be used in connection with financial crime.²⁵ This objective integrates the relevant efforts of financial regulators with those of other criminal law intelligence, investigation, and prosecution agencies. Together with certain new powers set out in the FSMA, it enables the FSA to build on the work that existing regulators have undertaken in this area in the past. Its prime focus is to ensure that financial institutions have systems and practices in place to protect themselves against being used as vehicles by financial criminals, especially by way of money laundering. In its effort, the FSA works closely with other organizations such as the police and various public prosecutors.

Principles of Good Regulation

In pursuing its objectives, the FSA is required to take into account six additional principles of good regulation set out in the FSMA.²⁶ The principles and the FSA's interpretation of them are as follows.

1. *Efficiency and economy.* This principle relates to the way in which the FSA allocates and uses its resources. When addressing a specific risk, the FSA is required to choose the options that are most efficient and economical. It goes beyond the statutory requirement to consult on fees and consult on its budget, explaining how it plans to use the funds levied through regulated firms. The nonexecutive committee of the FSA Board is required among other things to oversee the use of resources and to report to the Treasury every year.
2. *Role of management.* A firm's senior management is responsible for its activities and for ensuring that its business complies with regulatory requirements. This principle is designed to guard against unnecessary intrusion by the regulator into firms' business and requires the FSA to hold senior management responsible for risk management and controls within firms.
3. *Proportionality.* The restrictions imposed on firms and markets should be in proportion to the expected benefits for consumers and the industry. In making judgments in this area, the FSA takes into account the costs to firms and consumers. One of the main techniques the FSA uses is analysis of the costs and benefits of proposed regulatory requirements. This approach is shown, in particular, in different regulatory requirements applied to wholesale and retail markets.
4. *Innovation.* The FSA should allow and encourage innovation—for example, by avoiding unreasonable barriers to entry or not restricting existing market participants from launching new financial products and services. This duty is best pursued through the maintenance of close relationships between the regulators and regulated institutions. Institutions are thus encouraged to discuss new product ideas and new market developments with the FSA at an early stage to ensure that the risks—for them and their customers—are properly understood and managed from the outset.
5. *International character of financial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the UK.* London is a uniquely international center of financial services, with many foreign banks and other financial institutions conducting business within the jurisdiction. Much of the business undertaken in the UK is internationally mobile, and almost all aspects of the FSA's responsibilities have an international dimension. The FSA is therefore committed to playing a full part in discussions with international regulatory bodies, to ensure that the UK's influence on the

development of international regulatory standards is commensurate with the weight of its markets in global terms. In many areas, this work proceeds in partnership with the Bank of England.

The FSA also considers the effect on UK markets and consumers of the economic, industry, and regulatory situation overseas. It takes into account the international mobility of financial business and seeks to avoid damaging the competitive position of the UK. This involves cooperating with overseas regulators, both to agree on international standards and to monitor global firms and markets effectively. Especially within the European Union, cooperation with other member states' regulators has taken the form of formal networks, such as the Committee of European Securities Commissions.

6. *Competition.* The FSA must avoid unnecessarily distorting or impeding competition.²⁷ This includes avoiding unnecessary regulatory barriers to entry or business expansion. Competition and innovation considerations play a key role in the FSA's cost-benefit analysis work. Under the FSMA, both the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission will have a role to play in reviewing the impact of the FSA's rules and practices on competition.

A Comparative Analysis

When one lines up the justifications for financial regulation in the United States with the regulatory goals of the FSA as articulated in the FSMA, a number of interesting differences emerge, many of which factor into the differences in organizational structure that have evolved in the two countries.

Primacy of Market Confidence over Consumer Protection

An initial point of divergence is over the primary mission of each country's system of financial regulation. In the United States, consumer protection is typically advanced as the most prominent justification for financial regulation. Although systemic risk is also a consideration—particularly in the area of depository institutions—the primary mission of much of U.S. financial regulation is to protect consumers from corporate overreaching or unexpected financial failures. Under the FSMA, the priorities of the regulatory agency are reversed. The first statutory goal of the FSA is the maintenance of market confidence—an aspiration highly analogous to the containment of systemic risk.

Different Approach to Consumer Protection

The degree of consumer protection sought under the FSMA is also quite different from that characteristic of U.S. regulatory structures. While the United States through its public insurance programs and extensive enforcement apparatus—both public and private—often purports to afford

comprehensive or nearly comprehensive protections for consumers, the FMSA establishes a much more modulated approach to the problem. In its statutory objectives, the act calls for only an “appropriate degree” of consumer protection and then expressly notes the importance of managerial oversight from private firms. The principles of good regulation amplify this perspective by again noting the role of management in ensuring regulatory compliance and in two different principles (the one on efficiency and economy and the second on proportionality) emphasizing the importance of cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation.

Competition and Innovation as a Regulatory Goal

From an American perspective, another striking characteristic of the regulatory mission of the FSA is the prominence given competition and innovation as explicit goals of the agency. While U.S. financial regulatory agencies are often directed to take competitive considerations into account, typically these directions are framed as limiting principle on other regulatory goals.²⁸ Under the FSMA, competition and innovation are expressly listed as independent principles of good regulation. Even more strikingly, the preservation of London as a leading financial center is elevated to a regulatory goal. To a certain degree, this elevation of competition and innovation could be understood as an extension of other principles advancing goals of cost-justified regulation. However, there is also—it seems to me—something like a legacy of an older system of self-regulation in the City that has a quite different flavor than most financial regulation in the United States.

Differences in Other Regulatory Goals

Another telling difference between U.S. and UK regulatory goals relates to the secondary regulatory missions that characterize each country’s regulatory aspirations. Under the FSMA, the FSA is given a relatively modest set of supplementary goals: improving the financial education of consumers and reducing financial crime. Analogs of both regulatory goals can be found in the U.S. regulatory structure. Improving understanding of self-directed retirement savings accounts, such as 401(k) plans, has been a priority of the Department of Labor for a number of years, and the SEC also devotes some of its resources to individual investor education. On the financial crime side, federal legislation regarding money laundering has been on the books for many years, and was substantially enhanced in the Patriot Act after the September 11 terrorist attacks. But notably absent from the FSMA is the relatively extensive set of secondary roles that U.S. financial regulators are called upon to play. As explained above, these goals include both social equality and income redistribution, regulatory objectives that are singularly absent from the FSA’s mandate. In addition, our regulatory system expressly advances certain visions of political economy, including the preservation of smaller, local financial institutions (par-

ticularly in the field of depository institutions) and also a fragmented system of financial regulation (both between federal and state authorities and within the federal government). The FSMA shares none of these missions. Indeed, to the extent that the agency's mandate includes the preservation of London as a financial center, one might infer a slight bias in favor of larger institutions and a unified system of oversight.

Implications for Regulatory Structure

The differences in the goals of financial regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States have, in my view, a direct impact on the regulatory structure that each country has adopted. The relationship is most obvious in the case of our political preference for divided systems of financial regulation, which is flatly inconsistent with a consolidated supervisory structure. But the other differences noted above also, I think, play into the variation in organizational structure.

For example, both the FSMA's mandate for cost-effective regulation and regulation that promotes innovation and competition tend to favor less extensive regulatory structures. Moreover, to the extent that the FSA's primary mission is to prevent systemic risks and not to ensure the safety and soundness of each consumer's investments, the scope of regulatory oversight is likely to be less extensive than in the United States, where consumer protection is of central importance. When one factors in the cost of imposing the much more extensive secondary regulatory goals of U.S. supervisors, the likely differences in regulatory intensity between the two countries expand further. While one might quibble about the relationship between regulatory intensity and organizational structure, a plausible hypothesis is that as the degree of regulatory intensity increases, consolidation of regulatory functions becomes more cumbersome and difficult to achieve.

The organizational structure of the FSA itself also reflects, I believe, the policy goals of the underlying legislation. As has been elaborated in other articles, one of the distinctive features of the British Financial Services Authority is the functional manner in which the agency is organized.²⁹ Rather than maintaining separate divisions for the various sectors of the financial services industry, the FSA's regulatory staff is divided into three functional directorates (see Figure 2.1). As outlined below, this organizational structure can be explained in terms of the FSMA's statutory objectives and principles of good regulation.

The first directorate—the Regulatory Processes and Risk Directorate—handles authorizations (i.e., licensing) and enforcement for all sectors of the financial services industry in addition to maintaining a division that considers regulatory strategies and risk analysis. This directorate is truly cross-sectoral in that all of its operating divisions span the financial services industry.³⁰ To achieve this same result in the United States, the insur-

ance company licensing offices of the fifty states would need to be combined with the OCC’s chartering unit—along with SEC, NASD, and state Blue Sky procedures for registering new broker-dealers—in a single division of a regulatory body. And then, as part of the same division, the enforcement staffs of all banking, securities, insurance, and futures regulatory agencies would need to be located as part of the same division in neighboring offices. Although it is not clear whether consolidations of this sort would be cost-effective within the context of the U.S. regulatory structure, within the United Kingdom this approach to licensing and enforcement arguably improves efficiency and is thus consistent with this aspect of the agency’s statutory objectives. Similarly, setting up a separate unit to consider regulatory strategy and overall risk allows the agency to deploy its supervisory resources in a more cost-effective manner than would likely be possible if the organization were divided into more familiar sectoral divisions.³¹

The FSA’s two other functional divisions—the Consumer, Investment and Insurance Directorate and the Deposit Takers and Markets Directorate—also strike me as heavily influenced by the agency’s statutory objectives, although in a manner that may not be immediately apparent to foreign observers. Both of these directorates include divisions linked to particular subsectors of the financial services industry as well as more general functional authority. What is confusing for U.S. observers about this arrangement is that elements of the securities industry are spread across the two directorates. Exchanges are located in the Deposit Takers and Markets Directorate, whereas collective investment vehicles and certain retail brokerage functions are located in the Consumer, Investment and Insurance Directorate. While this allocation of responsibility divides what we




Figure 2.1. The FSA organizational structure

think of as SEC functions in the United States, it arguably follows the functional divisions implicit in the FSA's regulatory objective. The Deposit Takers and Markets Directorate has responsibility for the agency's foremost mission: the preservation of overall market integrity. The directorate therefore deals with those financial activities most likely to threaten that integrity, including major financial conglomerates and exchanges, and includes a separate division specializing in prudential regulation. The Consumer, Investment and Insurance Directorate, on the other hand, deals with the areas in which consumer protection rather than market integrity is the key concern.

This division between market integrity functions and consumer protection functions strikes me as one of the most interesting features of the FSA's regulatory structure with potentially far-reaching consequences for regulatory policy. As others have noted before, this organizational structure allows for truly consolidated supervision. Of necessity, consumer protection in various subsectors of the financial services industry—whether insurance, banking, or securities products—will be informed by practices in other sectors. Similarly, oversight of market integrity will tend to become more comparable across sectors as supervisory standards emanate from a unified authority. So the twin peaks approach to financial supervision allows for more consistent oversight across sectors of the financial services industry.

But the separation of market integrity from consumer protection at the FSA also strikes me as an important manifestation of the FMSA's twin goals of achieving an extremely high level of protection of the integrity of markets but imposing a lighter touch in the field of consumer protection. Empowered to focus its efforts exclusively on identifying and eliminating risks that might plausibly threaten the overall financial system, the Deposit Takers and Exchange Directorate can keep its eye on the big fish of systemic risk without being constantly distracted by the multitudinous minnows of consumer protection. The regulatory muscle of the directorate can therefore be deployed where perceived risks to market integrity are greatest and not in a manner required to eliminate the largest number of relatively minor harms.³²

The creation of the Consumer, Insurance and Investment Directorate similarly splits off what I would characterize as the FMSA's lesser goal of advancing consumer protection. As mentioned above, the act in a way characterizes consumer protection as a regulatory function that should be advanced in a limited manner and on a cost-conscious basis, with consumer education and delegation of responsibility to management as viable alternatives to direct regulation. By separating out issues of market integrity—where supervisory standards toward infractions and risk are necessarily more absolute—the FSA structure increases the likelihood that consumer protection goals will be advanced on a more cost-effective basis.

To make the preceding points slightly more concrete, compare the U.S. approach to the regulation of depository institutions to that of the FSA's. While the United States does have some specialized regulations for large financial conglomerates, it generally organizes its regulatory structures by industry sector and imposes mandatory on-site examinations of depository institutions on a regular basis, regardless of whether the depository institutions in question impose any substantial threat to market integrity. A variety of factors explain this system of comprehensive examination—the exposure of both the FDIC and uninsured depositors to losses is undoubtedly an important consideration. But also, I would argue, U.S. financial regulatory authorities are not constrained by a governmental mandate of the sort made explicit in the FSA—that supervisory initiative, particularly in the area of consumer protection, should be imposed only when cost-effective. Rather their tendency is to favor equal treatment in the regulation of financial institutions, regardless of the risks particular institutions impose on market integrity or the efficacy of regulation from an economic perspective, and to keep financial failures to a minimum.³³

Intensity of Financial Regulation

In speculating as to the reasons why British financial regulation was consolidated into a unified regulatory agency whereas nothing remotely comparable has occurred in the United States, I would propose as a further factor differences in regulatory intensity between the two countries in the area of financial regulation. To a certain degree, this difference is a function of the relatively broader goals of U.S. financial regulation that I recounted in the preceding section. After all, in seeking to advance more social functions, U.S. financial regulators inevitably require more staffing and larger budgets. Moreover, certain of the regulatory goals in each country contribute to differences in levels of regulatory intensity. The British requirement that cost efficiency factor into all regulatory initiatives tends to constrain the level of regulatory intensity in that jurisdiction, where the U.S. predilection for divided governmental authority tends to produce overlapping jurisdictions and larger overall regulatory budgets.³⁴

Whatever the explanation for differences in regulatory intensity, their existence offers an independent factor in explaining why the United States has not moved to a system of regulatory consolidation found in the United Kingdom and elsewhere around the world. The size and intensity of U.S. financial services regulation—both in absolute and adjusted terms—is exceptional. The substantial differences in regulatory intensity between the two jurisdictions also raises fascinating (and extremely difficult) normative questions about whether both countries are maintaining appropriate levels of regulatory intensity or whether one of the countries is operating at a

level of intensity that is substantially suboptimal. Aside from noting their intrinsic importance, I will leave these issues to another day.

The data presented in this section comes from several sources: partially my own research, partially from data that the FSA itself compiles each year in its annual reports, and partially from research conducted under my supervision by students at Harvard Law School. I first compare regulatory staffing and budget levels for U.S. and UK financial authorities at the turn of the millennium, as the FSA was being established. Next I offer an expanded data set offering comparable data about these two countries and several other jurisdictions. I then present some additional, more detailed data about securities enforcement efforts in both jurisdictions from 1999 to 2001. The section ends with some tentative conclusions and suggestions for further research.

Overall Regulatory Budgets and Staffing Levels

An initial and useful point of departure is a review of the overall staffing levels in both jurisdictions. For the United Kingdom, this task is fairly straightforward as the country's regulatory functions are now largely centralized in the FSA; for the United States, however, the undertaking is considerably more substantial as our system of regulatory oversight remains highly fragmented. I therefore begin this section with a quick review of my own estimates of U.S. regulatory budgets and staffing levels in the 1998–2000 period and then compare them to the levels of staffing reported for the FSA in its 2000/2001 *Annual Report*.

My estimates for U.S. regulatory budgets and staffing levels are presented in Table 2.1 and represent data compiled during the 1998 to 2000 time period, roughly contemporaneous to the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the establishment of the FSA. As summarized in the table, personnel and annual expenditures are divided into the financial subsectors of depository institutions (including banks, thrifts, and credit unions), insurance companies, the securities industry, the futures industry, and

Table 2.1. Summary of annual U.S. regulatory costs
(1998–2000 data—partial)

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Annual expenditures</i>	<i>Annual expenses/ personnel</i>
Depository institutions	22,175	\$2,751,089,581	\$124,064
Insurance companies	11,817	\$738,000,000	\$62,452
Securities industry	4,889	\$644,900,000	\$131,908
Futures industry	556	\$62,761,000	\$112.879
Pensions & benefits	2,285	\$331,147,000	\$144,922
Total	41,722	\$4,527,897,581	\$108,526

pension and benefits. The table is denominated partial because data on certain elements of the U.S. financial regulatory structure are not available—notably data about budgets and personnel for state securities regulators.³⁵

The data presented in Table 2.1 is striking in several respects. First is the absolute size of the country's financial oversight efforts: nearly 42,000 employees and an annual budget in excess of \$4.5 billion dollars. Second is the relatively large share of both overall budgets and personnel the U.S. allocates to the regulation of depository institutions: more than 53 percent of total personnel and nearly 61 percent of budgetary resources. A third point of interest is the variation in the ratio of annual expenditures to personnel in the various sectors of the financial services industry. The average expenditure levels per employee in the insurance industry (\$62,452) is dramatically lower than that of other subsectors. While costs of operation may be lower for insurance regulators, as they are located throughout the country and not concentrated in more expensive urban centers such as Washington and New York City, one might reasonably infer that some of the variation reflects differences in expertise and training. In contrast, annual expenditures for personnel regulating the securities industry (\$131,908) and pensions and benefits (\$144,922) tend to be higher.

Table 2.2 presents roughly comparable data for the Financial Services Authority and is drawn from the FSA's 2000/2001 *Annual Report*.³⁶ In some areas, there are similarities between the FSA's levels of expenditures and those presented for U.S. regulatory agencies in Table 2.1. In both countries, resources are distributed across industry subsectors, and the ratio of annual expenditures to personnel in the UK (\$119,349) is similar to total annual expenditures to total personnel in the United States (\$108,526).³⁷ On balance, however, the differences between Table 2.2 and Table 2.1 are more striking than the similarities. Note first the difference in the allocation of resources. Whereas more than half of U.S. regulatory personnel and budgets were allocated to depository institutions, the FSA allocates over 60 percent of its budget to the securities industry and only slightly more than 25 percent to depository institutions.³⁸ A number of factors undoubtedly contribute to the smaller percentage of budgetary resources allocated to depository institutions in the United States—notably, the very high number of depository institutions that still operate in the United States and the balkanized system of banking regulation that we maintain—but the resulting difference in the level of budgetary expenditures remains nonetheless noteworthy.

For current purposes, an even more important difference between the regulatory expenditures and personnel levels of the FSA and those of the United States is the absolute difference in scale. Total annual expenditures on financial regulation in the United States during 1998–2000 were in excess of \$4.5 billion, or 13.7 times the annual expenditures of the FSA pre-

sented in Table 2.2. Personnel levels of the United States (41,722) were more than fifteen times higher than those of the FSA (2,765). These huge differences in regulatory scale offer, I think, an independent reason why consolidation of the sort accomplished in the FMSA for the United Kingdom was never even discussed in the period leading up to the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.

In pondering the different levels of regulatory expenditure and personnel noted in the previous paragraph, one must recognize that these multiples do not simply reflect differences in the size of the two economies in question. In 2003, the U.S. GDP was 6.8 times the UK GDP.³⁹ The U.S. 2000 population was 4.6 times the UK population.⁴⁰ Nor is the difference simply a reflection of financial markets. As reported in the FSA 2000/2001 *Annual Report*, U.S. banking assets were only 2.2 times UK banking assets and U.S. equity market capitalization was only 5.8 times UK equity market

Table 2.2. FSA annual budget and personnel
(Data from FSA 2000–2001 Annual Report)

	<i>Annual expenditures (000s)</i>	<i>Personnel</i>
Total depository institutions	\$ 91,500	n.a.
Credit institutions	\$ 82,500	
Credit unions	\$ 1,500	
Mortgages	\$ 7,500	
Total insurance companies (life, pension, & nonlife)	\$ 22,500	n.a.
Total securities industry	\$216,000	n.a.
Securities firms	\$ 28,500	
Exchanges	\$ 6,000	
Capital markets	\$ 6,000	
Listings	\$ 16,500	
Collective investments	\$ 27,000	
Financial advisors	\$ 84,000	
Ombudsman & compensation scheme	\$ 48,000	
Grand total	\$330,000	2,765

capitalization.⁴¹ None of these ratios approaches the ratios of regulatory expenditures and personnel levels revealed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Accordingly, even if one normalized annual expenditures for the size of the economy or capital markets, substantial differences would remain.

The relatively higher levels of regulatory costs and personnel levels for British authorities is consistent with the hypothesis advanced above that the mission of UK financial regulators is more narrowly constrained than the mission of their U.S. counterparts. That these differences persist even after adjusting for relative size of the two countries' economies and financial markets is all the more striking when one considers that economies of scale might be expected to lower the size-adjusted costs of U.S. financial regulation.

Expanded Set of Comparative Data from FSA 2002/2003 Annual Report

To confirm that the data presented above is not a statistical anomaly peculiar to a period when the FSA was just getting started and the pound sterling was relatively weak compared to the U.S. dollar, I have also examined data presented in the FSA's 2002/2003 *Annual Report*, which includes more recent information on FSA budget and staffing levels as well as comparable data for a number of other jurisdictions, including the United States.⁴² With respect to all of the comparison and contrast noted above, the later compilation of data confirms the points I have made about differences between UK and U.S. regulatory intensity a few years earlier. But this expanded data set is also illuminating in that it suggests how the regulatory intensity of UK and U.S. financial regulation compares with regulatory counterparts around the world.

Consider first total financial regulatory budgets and personnel levels for the ten jurisdictions on which the FSA collects data (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). By both measures, U.S. enforcement budgets and staffing levels overshadow not only those of the United Kingdom but also of all other jurisdictions covered. (Indeed, when one looks at the United Kingdom's regulatory intensity in this comparison set, one sees that if one puts the United States to one side, the absolute level of regulatory effort in the United Kingdom is much higher than that of the other jurisdictions reporting, thus offering some support for the conventional wisdom that the Americans and British have much in common in this area.)

As before, the differences in regulatory intensity hold up even when one makes adjustments for the size of the financial services industry in eight major jurisdictions.⁴³ To illustrate this point, I have presented in Figures 2.4 through 2.6 the FSA's estimates of regulatory budgets in the principal subsectors of the financial services industry (depository institutions, insurance companies, and securities firms) adjusted for proxies for the size of each subsector: banking assets in the case of depository institutions, insurance premia in the case of insurance companies, and equity market




Figure 2.2. Total costs of financial regulation in selected jurisdictions
 Source: FSA 2002/2003 Annual Report Appendix 8, at 205–06.




Figure 2.3. Total financial regulator personnel in selected jurisdictions
 Source: FSA 2002/2003 Annual Report Appendix 8, at 205–06.




Figure 2.4. Total cost of depository institution regulation adjusted for banking assets
 Source: FSA 2002/2003 Annual Report Appendix 8, at 205–06.

capitalization in the case of securities firms. Undoubtedly there are limitations in the quality and comparability of the data upon which the figures are based, but the broad consistency of the evidence is strongly supportive of several propositions.

First, with respect to both depository institution (Figures 2.2 and 2.4) and insurance company (Figure 2.5) regulation, the United States outstrips the United Kingdom and, for that matter, all of the other major jurisdictions presented. Compared to the other jurisdictions surveyed, the intensity of UK regulation does not appear to be especially high, being at the lower end of the comparison set for depository institution regulation and in the middle for insurance regulation. Where the relative intensity of the UK regulation rivals U.S. intensity is in the field of securities regulation (Figure 2.6), reflecting the fact noted earlier that most UK financial regulatory resources are deployed to the securities field. Two other common law jurisdictions also have very high relative levels of securities regulation—Australia and Canada—both actually outstripping the United States when adjusted for market capitalization.⁴⁴ The three major civil law jurisdictions presented in Figure 2.6—France, Germany, and Sweden—all show much lower levels of intensity for securities market regulation.

In an effort to summarize the foregoing data on financial regulatory intensity, Figure 2.7 presents total financial regulatory costs per billion dollars of GDP. Again, the United States leads the way with substantially higher adjusted regulatory intensity. The United Kingdom slips into third place by this measure, just behind Australia (buoyed by its relatively high intensity supervision in the securities field.) The three civil code jurisdictions—France, Germany, and Sweden—again fall to the bottom of the rankings of intensity, with the two other common law jurisdictions (Canada and the Irish Republic) occupying the middle terrain.

In sum, the comparative data on regulatory costs presented in the FSA's 2002/2003 *Annual Report* is consistent with my claim that regulatory intensity (as well as absolute levels of regulatory effort) are higher in the




Figure 2.5. Total financial regulator personnel in selected jurisdictions
 Source: FSA 2002/2003 Annual Report Appendix 8, at 205–06.

United States than in the United Kingdom. But the data also indicate that measured against a broader set of international comparison, the United Kingdom is at the upper end of most measures of regulatory intensity and consistently above the measure of regulatory intensity in the leading civil law countries surveyed.

Evidence of Comparative Enforcement Intensity

Another approach to regulatory intensity is to consider the outputs of regulatory oversight rather than inputs, such as the budgets and personnel levels considered above. In this spirit, several students of mine at Harvard Law School have recently undertaken comparative studies of securities enforcement efforts in various jurisdictions, including the United States and the United Kingdom.⁴⁵ While the data in these studies should also be regarded as preliminary, the results are both striking and consistent with my claim that there are substantial differences in regulatory intensity between the United States and the United Kingdom, even in the field of




Figure 2.6. Total costs of securities regulation adjusted for equity market capitalization

Source: FSA 2002/2003 Annual Report Appendix 8, at 205–06.




Figure 2.7. Total financial regulator personnel in selected jurisdictions

Source: FSA 2002/2003 Annual Report Appendix 8, at 205–06.

securities regulation where regulatory expenditures are not substantially different when adjusted for market capitalization.

A good example is the work of Joseph Martin (HLS '02) on overall securities enforcement levels. Figure 2.8 summarizes Martin's findings with respect to average annual securities enforcement actions for the United Kingdom and the United States. Data for the United Kingdom is first presented in terms of actual enforcement actions and then adjusted to reflect the fact that the U.S. capital markets are larger than UK markets.⁴⁶ Aside from the area of warnings—where there is no ready U.S. analog—United Kingdom sanction levels are lower than those of the United States. Only in the area of criminal sanctions is the UK system roughly comparable. In terms of total actions, suspensions and expulsions, and censures, U.S. enforcement efforts outstrip United Kingdom actions by large multiples, even after adjusting for relative market size.

Large differentials are also apparent in the area of monetary penalties, although this aspect of Martin's analysis requires additional explanation. In the United States, there are two major sources of monetary sanctions for securities law violations: public enforcement action (which Martin estimates to be imposed at an average annual rate of \$770 million during the period in question) and securities litigation, both settled proceedings and cases that go to trial or other forms of dispute resolution (averaging slightly over \$4 billion a year). In the United Kingdom, Martin reports that monetary sanctions are principally imposed to regulatory actions, and while these sanction levels on an adjusted basis are not wholly out of line with U.S. public sanctions, the overall level of securities sanctions in the United

	U.K. Actual	U.K. Adjusted	U.S.
Total Actions	758	3,319	10,641
Total Monetary Penalty	\$103 million	\$449 million	\$4,804 million - \$ 4,034 million private \$ 770 million public
Suspensions & Expulsions	47	206	2313
Censures	14	63	1207
Warnings	128	560	0
Total Prison (months)	282	1236	1661

Figure 2.8. Annual U.S. vs. UK enforcement, 1997–2001

Source: Martin, Comparative Enforcement of Securities Laws (Apr. 2002)

Kingdom falls far short of those in the United States once one adds in sanctions on private litigation. (Note that the data in this analysis predates the Enron scandal and associated enforcement proceedings over the past few years and thus substantially understates differences in enforcement that one would likely observe if this analysis were updated.)

In sum, the level of regulatory intensity in the United Kingdom appears to be substantially lower than that of the United States, both in absolute and adjusted terms. Numerous factors may contribute to this difference. As I have suggested above, different and generally more modest regulatory goals in the United Kingdom as compared to the United States likely explain a portion of this lower level of regulatory intensity. Other factors—differences in the composition of the financial services industry in the two jurisdictions as well as the lawfulness of market participants in the two countries—may also explain some of the difference in regulatory intensity. For current purposes, I make only the modest claim that differences in regulatory intensity offer another reason why British regulators were able to consolidate much of the financial regulatory system in the late 1990s when U.S. counterparts made no similar efforts. I leave for another day the more intriguing and difficult question of whether the substantial differences in regulatory intensity that separate the United States from not just the United Kingdom but most other industrialized nations might suggest substantial misallocation of regulatory resources and enforcement efforts in some major financial markets.

Notes

Author's note: I would like to express my thanks for financial support from the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business. I also benefited from valuable research assistance from Cameron Half, Duncan Herrington, Kyong Lee, Joseph Martin, and Yannis Avgerinos, whose research into British regulatory objectives was particularly useful. I am also grateful to Professor Sung-In Jun for his insightful commentary, which has raised a number of important issues that I hope to address in future writings on regulatory intensity.

1. See Raphael La. Porta et al., "Law and Finance," *Journal of Political Economy* (December 1998).
2. In addition to work prepared for this conference, good background on the evolution of the Financial Services Authorities can be found in Eilis Ferran, "Examining the United Kingdom's Experience in Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model"; Gerard McMeel, "An Overview of United Kingdom Financial Services Regulatory Reform"; and Michael Taylor, "Accountability and Objectives of the FSA." For an illuminating set of articles comparing U.S. and UK regulatory policies, see Heidi Schooner and Michael Taylor's "The United Kingdom and Unit-

ed States Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets” and “Convergence and Competition: The Case of the Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States.”

3. For a good overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley legislation, see Michael P. Malloy, “Banking in the Twenty-First Century.”
4. See McMeel, page 6 (noting residual supervisory authority of the Council of Lloyd’s, as well as overlapping jurisdictions of Bank of England and separate regulation of occupational pensions outside of the FSA structure).
5. See Dean Anason, “Financial Council’s Power, Scope, Makeup Criticized,” page 3.
6. See Malloy, pages 812–813 (describing Gramm-Leach-Bliley provisions calling for establishment of a new National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers).
7. One plausible explanation for the variation might stem from differences in our national tastes for federalism. Although devolution is on the rise in Britain, our federalism is much stronger and more deeply rooted. However, the regulatory fragmentation in the United States is not just a matter of federalism. Federal oversight of depository institutions is divided among the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency, and then further subdivided into specialized subagencies for thrifts (the Office of Thrift Supervision) and credit unions (the National Credit Union Administration). Securities and commodities are regulated separately at the federal level; in addition, three different federal agencies share jurisdiction of pension regulation. Plus an assortment of other financial regulatory matters are delegated to a host of other federal agencies: money laundering to the Treasury, mortgage lending to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and various insurance issues to the Internal Revenue Service. Plus a wide range of self-regulatory agencies and trade groups perform important regulatory or quasiregulatory functions on a national basis.
8. Efforts to modernize the regulation of financial services in the United States date back to at least the first half of the 1980s, when then vice president George H. W. Bush chaired a study group on the subject.
9. See, for example, Section 304 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714 (West 2004), specifying that courts review decisions regarding the definition of insurance activities “without unequal deference” to either banking or insurance regulators.
10. See Ferran.
11. The only nearly analogous experience in the United States was the role the Securities and Exchange Commission played in the 1930s when it produced a comprehensive study of investment companies that greatly influenced the adoption of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and

- related legislation. See Howell E. Jackson and Edward L. Symons, *The Regulation of Financial Institutions: Cases and Materials* (1999). But in that case, the SEC was already a formally established agency and the initiative involved only an extension of its authority into a new sector of the securities industry.
12. For example, the Clinton administration's extraordinarily modest effort to have Congress authorize the creation of a National Council of Financial Services Regulators was almost immediately attacked on the grounds that the selection of a state insurance commissioner to participate in the council might violate the appointments clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Anason.
 13. For an overview of FSA accountability provisions, see Gwen Bevers, "The Accountability of the Financial Services Authority under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000."
 14. Outside of the financial services industry, a good example of this tendency was the Clinton administration's early efforts to reform the health care industry. Shortly after the administration released its comprehensive legislative proposal, critics had little difficulty finding numerous details that in isolation seemed illogical or unpalatable.
 15. The emergence of the FSA during this period is very nicely summarized in Michael Foot's paper for this conference.
 16. See section 103(a) of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k) (2004), establishing procedures for coordination between the Federal Reserve Board and the secretary of the Treasury in defining financial activities.
 17. For an overview of this regulatory cooperation, see II Melanie L. Fein, "Banking and Financial Services."
 18. In the years since the establishment of the FSA, the consolidation of regulatory agencies has itself become an agenda item for legislative reformers in the European Union and around the world. In the recent accession of new members, one structural issue that each new member nation faced was whether or not to adopt a system of consolidated supervision in the course of complying with EU standards of financial supervision. See Karel Lannoo, "The Emerging Regulatory Framework for Banking and Securities Markets in the CEECs." Though not formally a requirement of any EU directive, consolidated supervision is now firmly on the regulatory agenda around the world, thanks no doubt to the perceived success of the model in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. While the trend toward consolidated supervision has not yet become universal, numerous jurisdictions have opted for this model of regulatory reform, particularly in smaller countries where the approach's potential for cost savings seems to have most salience.
 19. See Howell E. Jackson, "Regulation of a Multisectoral Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay."

20. FSMA, Secs. 2(1) and 2(2).
21. FSA, "A New Regulator for the New Millennium." Although the FSA seeks ways of minimizing the impact of failures on market confidence, it is of the view that achieving a "zero failure" regime is not only impossible but also undesirable, as it would be excessively burdensome for regulated firms and the economy as a whole and would not accord with the statutory objectives and principles.
22. For an analysis of the "information problem" and the FSA's objective to provide financial education, see Patrick Ring, "Education, Advice and the Financial Services Authority's Statutory Objective."
23. FSA, "A New Regulator for the New Millennium," page 7.
24. FSMA, Sec. 225 et seq.
25. According to the FSA, the three main types of financial crime are: (a) money laundering; (b) fraud or dishonesty, including financial e-crime and fraudulent marketing of investments; and (c) criminal market misconduct, including insider dealing. See FSA, "A New Regulator for the New Millennium." page 9.
26. FSMA, Sec. 2(3).
27. In order to assist policy makers when they deal with the principle of competition, the FSA has issued a guide to competition analysis in financial services; see FSA, "Making Policy in the FSA: How to Take Account of Competition."
28. Under the Banking Holding Company Act, for example, the Federal Reserve Board has long been required to consider whether its approval of an acquisition will cause competitive harm. This sort of oversight is quite different from competitive considerations reflected in the FSMA, which seek more to enhance the competitive posture of UK firms and markets in comparison to their foreign competitors. Within U.S. regulatory circles, it is not uncommon for officials to be mindful of competitive harms that new requirements might impose on U.S. firms or markets—consider for example recent debates over the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on foreign firms—but the advancement of U.S. competitive interests is seldom described as a principal goal of U.S. regulatory policy.
29. See Michael Taylor and Alex Fleming, "Integrated Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision in the Context of EU Accession; Giorgio Di Giorgio, "Financial Market Regulation and Supervision: How Many Peaks for the Euro Area?"; and Jeroen J. M. Kremers et al., "Cross-Sector Supervision: Which Model?"
30. Curiously, in recent organizational reforms the FSA has added a division of High Street firms—that is, companies that provide certain mortgage and insurance services to retail customers—and this division includes a separate authorization department that is outside the Regu-

- latory Processes and Risk Directorate. It is unclear why the FSA departed from its cross-sectoral approach to licensing in this instance.
31. See FSA, "A New Regulator for the New Millennium."
 32. See FSA, "A New Regulator for the New Millennium."
 33. Another example of this phenomenon in the United States is the traditional uniformity of pricing of deposit insurance for small and large banks, notwithstanding substantial differences in risks and costs of failure.
 34. The overall effect of overlapping jurisdictions on regulatory intensity is ambiguous. In certain contexts, overlapping jurisdictions might lead to regulatory competition of the sort that reduces regulatory intensity. Although one cannot discount this possibility out of hand, the data on regulatory intensity in this section casts doubt on the significance of that sort of regulatory competition in this context.
 35. The data underlying this table is to be presented in a separate technical note. In certain areas where regulatory agencies perform multiple functions, I have had to allocate a percentage of budgets and personnel to financial regulatory purposes. One example is the Federal Reserve Board, which provides both central banking and payment systems services as well as regulatory functions. In addition, two of the U.S. agencies responsible for pensions and employee benefits—the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labor—conduct many activities that are unrelated to financial services. As mentioned in the text, the table does not include data on state securities commissions; data on the principal securities industry SROs (the NYSE and NASD) are, however, included. Also not included in this table are several agencies that perform relatively modest oversight functions in the financial services industry. These include the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which oversees certain elements of the mortgage market as well as certain government sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are a form of financial institutions. Because of these omissions, the data presented in Table 2.1 somewhat underestimates the level of financial service regulation in the United States.
 36. See *FSA Annual Report 2000/2001*, Appendix 6, page 81 (available online at <http://www.fsa>). The data presented in the *FSA Annual Report* is only roughly comparable because certain regulatory functions in the United Kingdom—most notably oversight of certain employment based pension schemes—are regulated elsewhere. The London Stock Exchange also still engages in a limited amount of regulatory functions not captured in Table 2.2. The *FSA Annual Report* denominates expenditures in pounds sterling; the data in Table 2.2 are presented in U.S. dollars, converted at an exchange rate of 1.5 dollars per pound sterling.

37. The ratio of annual expenditures to personnel for the FSA is not shown in Table 2.2, but it can be derived from the data in that table. To some degree, the fact that FSA expenditure per employee is higher than U.S. expenditure per employee is perhaps surprising, as average wages and GDP per capital are significantly higher in the United States. This difference may be partially attributed to the fact that most FSA employees work in the London area, which has a high cost of living. In addition, the FSA has made more of an effort to match market compensation levels, at least for its more senior employees.
38. Were Table 2.2 expanded to include oversight of other sources of British financial regulation—for example, occupational pension schemes—the ratio of total expenditures allocated to depository institutions would fall further.
39. World Bank estimates of GDP for 2003.
40. See Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, *Penn World Table Version 6.1*.
41. See *FSA 2000/2001 Annual Report*, Appendix 5, page 81.
42. See *FSA Annual Report 2002/2003*, Appendix 8 (pounds sterling converted to U.S. dollars at 1.7 dollars to the pound). The FSA's data on U.S. financial regulators is less extensive than my own, but I present their data here in order to maintain—to the extent possible—comparability with other jurisdictions on which the FSA also collected data. As the notes accompanying the FSA cost estimates make clear, comparative surveys of this sort are difficult to undertake, and some of the data is necessarily incomplete and incommensurate across jurisdictions. Accordingly, the data presented in the following pages should be regarded as suggestive rather than definitive. As explained later, I think the overall import of the data is sufficiently clear that one can draw at least preliminary conclusions from it.
43. For purposes of these presentations, I have excluded two jurisdictions presented in earlier figures: Hong Kong and Singapore. Their position as financial service centers distinguishes them from the other jurisdictions. Interestingly, the intensity of their financial oversight as measured in these figures is often quite high—in the area of insurance regulation, it is even higher than that of the United States. While tangential to the subject at hand, the relative intensity of the regulatory efforts of Hong Kong and Singapore warrants further study.
44. The relative intensity of Australian and Canadian securities enforcement likely reflects both the decentralized system of regulation adopted in these two jurisdictions and also their relatively low levels of stock market capitalization.
45. See Joseph Martin, “Comparative Enforcement of Securities Laws” (April 2002). See also Wai-Yin Alice Yu, “The Enforcement of Securities Laws in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Hong Kong, Singapore,

- South Korea and Taiwan from 1998 to 2002" (April 29, 2003); and Duncan Herrington, "Insider Trading and Market Performance" (May 3, 2004).
46. The adjustments in Martin's paper are based on trading volumes as opposed to stock market capitalization.

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Comments

Choong-Kee Lee

This paper deals with the UK reform of financial regulations from a wide perspective, with strong reference to the consolidation of regulators. The paper moves easily from explaining historical perspectives of the UK financial regulation to a restrained but telling indication of where the UK reform should go further. The author particularly points out the political and financial situation when the new Labour government came to power in 1997 and the following process of the consolidation, through which the new regulator was created. The author argues that the UK regulatory reform of consolidation is natural and to be justified from all these surrounding circumstances.

The core part of this paper deals with the legal and managerial challenges that have been apparent in the first six years of the FSA's life, in particular in the two and half years in which it has had full power. After explaining the six statutory arrangements for the FSA under the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, the author indicates and analyzes the main challenges that the FSA had to and will have to address, which in his view have potential importance for other countries going down a similar route.

The first challenge raised is that "too many organizations were to be put together at one time, and furthermore no one body was going to *come out on top* in the new FSA." According to the author, the fact that there is no dominant body within the predecessor organizations in part derived from the diversity of the new top management and their promise to take best features of the predecessor bodies, and in the end that odd fact was beneficial to the parties involved, resolving the first challenge. I am very sympathetic with the author's argument.

Then the author points out the second challenge resulting from the fact that "various regulatory disciplines had grown up separately among different regulators who had different visions about regulation and were used to operating different regulatory techniques." Here the author's recounting of the various examples of conflicts between different lines of regulatory thinking (such as prudential regulation versus COB regulation, formal regulation versus informal regulation, etc.) is compelling. Then the author convincingly proposes the answer to the conflict in that the way forward is to cement a *new* culture and to tackle the huge range of regulatory issues by creating a new "language" with which the new regulator can describe, monitor, and mitigate various regulatory issues and risks. This paper explains superbly how the UK concept of risk-based regulation

has come up, reflecting the author's close understanding of the regulatory process as well as his deep knowledge of financial scandals where the risks were not properly managed.

The third challenge that the author talks about is the efficacy of staffing and financing an effective regulator—in other words, “how relatively few and small regulators had and have to face an ever-growing increase in complexity in the markets and products that they regulate.” The author argues that the previous segmented regulators faced very difficult staffing/resource decisions, but on balance the creation of the FSA has helped answer these questions through economies of scale. Another option for efficient regulation is the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). According to the author, although the CBA is still a blunt tool—because the concept of cost or benefits is still vague—the CBA does give transparency to what can be estimated and what is assertion and allow the affected or the opponent the chance to challenge the policy decisions. On the other hand, the author does not believe the efficacy of the “compare and contrast approach,” although the approach is adopted and used in the FSA. He fears that there is no reliable short-term measure of efficacy of the regulator, even of the efficacy of individual policies. I am generally in agreement with these views.

The fourth challenge he identifies is “how to improve the financial capability of market participants.” The author believes that regulators should try to reduce their role in protecting the financial system, leaving it up to market forces to do as much of the job as possible. But according to him, this will be possible if and only if (a) adequate information is disclosed on which market participants can make decisions, and (b) market participants have the competence to reach rational judgements. As the author points out, the need for global institutions' enhanced disclosure for professional counterparties is set out by the Basel Committee in its proposal for Pillar 3 of the new Basel 2 proposals. For retail consumers, the problem is more acute. Levels of financial sophistication among the public are very low here in Korea as well. As the author points out, in the UK, financial capability initiative has been taken, backed by the FSA, which is going to target specific groups across the age spectrum from schoolchildren to the elderly. The author argues that such an initiative has been made easier by the creation of the FSA because of economies of scale. The consolidated FSA may also be able to look across the whole field of retail financial advice. This is an important point that Korean regulators should look at in educating the public.

Finally, the author raises as the last challenge the necessity of global regulation and the international regulatory cooperation to achieve it. According to him, the FSA has to maintain a relationship with 200 regulators and exchanges outside the UK in respect of a *single* group like HSBC. Furthermore, the FSA is a member of well over 150 international regulato-

ry committees, and the integration of the EU makes such membership even increasing. Likewise, with the proliferation of codes of good practice that have increasing importance in international forums, the national regulators are more and more concerned with such international initiatives. The author's point is that unification of the domestic regulatory structure has enabled the collective resources to go much further than if they are separate bodies, which is a convincing argument.

In closing, the author comments on the Korean financial regulators from his UK experience. In the Korean context, the author emphasizes the issue of improving corporate governance, perhaps because, in his view, the Korean regulatory regime is still in transition. And then the author identifies four important issues: (1) The current Korean structure of financial regulation appears complex and potentially unwieldy, particularly the strange split between the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), and the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), and the significant involvement of other bodies, including the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), the Bank of Korea (BOK), and the Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) in financial regulation; (2) these complex arrangements seem to contribute to uncertainty over the independence of the regulators (FSC, FSS and SFC) from the MOFE; (3) the quantity and quality of regulatory rules issued and the extent to which rules have been applied equally across firms; and (4) the possibility of conflict between the FSC's prudential responsibilities and those for restructuring in the corporate and financial sectors. As a whole, I agree with the points the author raises and would like to comment on these issues.

Issue of Corporate Governance of Regulators

The Pool of Eligible Candidates

As the author points out, improving corporate governance requires the creation of a body of professionally competent and independent-minded directors for public companies, but this could not be engineered overnight. This point is very relevant in the Korean context. Most of the main Korean reforms have put emphasis on the *structure* rather than *conduct* or *performance*, and such structural changes have often been carried out without the necessary pool of competent and independent candidates. A typical example is the statutory requirement of a certain number of outside directors in listed and financial companies. The same logic may be applicable to the regulators. If a governance system adopted in a regulator is too complex, it may require a large-scale recruitment for high-level positions. However, if the positions are filled by persons lacking competence, the governance system will not work properly and may not produce the antic-

ipated regulatory culture or performance. Instead, jobs might be offered to retired high-fliers, in the end raising regulatory costs.

Board Structure

As to the board structure of regulators, the author offers a defense of the British choice—an early FSA-style, top executive team—after comparing this and the SEC-style commissioners system. The author points out that so new and complex was the FSA and so important was the new culture created, the UK choice was the inevitable and right one. I am sympathetic with the author's argument. In particular, I want to emphasize two justifying factors for the UK choice: (1) At that time, various regulatory disciplines had already grown up separately among different regulators, and (i2) it is in a transition period in which the way forward was to cement a new culture by creating new "language."

An interesting question is whether the Korean regulators need such strong leadership or the SEC style of commissioners. The answer seems to depend on (1) whether various regulatory disciplines had grown up within the sectoral regulatory divisions and (2) whether Korean regulators are well settled or still in a transition period. It is arguable that since the current structure of financial regulation is still complex and regulatory powers are oddly dispersed between the FSC and the FSS, the system still needs reform, and thus we are in a transition period. That fact may justify the presence of strong leadership in the Korean regulators. But it is to be emphasized that the leadership is for creating a new regulatory culture rather than for efficiency of the regulatory operation.

Does the Current Regulatory Structure Need Reform?

Although a bit ambiguous, it is arguable that there is one financial policy maker and one frontline regulator in Korea. While the Financial Policy Division in the MOFE is in charge of setting up the institutional structure of regulation and responsible for the legislation it governs, the real regulatory activities are undertaken by the FSC and the FSS. On the one hand, the latter two bodies work together, and on the other each body acts separately, and thus it is possible to say Korea has either one or two frontline regulators. The difference is that the FSC is a government committee and the FSS is a nongovernmental body set up as a special corporate entity. The two bodies, however, are linked together through the same head of both organizations.

This odd structural shape resulted from the argument that enforcement powers, particularly the power of sanction, can only be exercised by governmental bodies. Thus, originally the FSC was envisioned as a conduit to provide governmental connection and formed of the committee members and a handful of government officials only. But the outbreak of the foreign exchange crisis in 1997 changed this landscape completely. The

crisis required a strong governmental body responsible for restructuring the financial and corporate sectors urgently, and the FSC was thought the best suitable candidate. And then the FSC was filled with a number of officials from various ministries—particularly the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which has now overgrown to form a big secretariat organization within the FSC.

The efficacy of the current structure has often been doubted whenever a financial scandal has broken out. The most recent occasion in which the issue has been raised is the debacle on the card company failures, which has produced 4 million defaulters and led to large-scale card company bailouts. The Board of Audit and Inspection has declared that the card company crisis resulted from s wrong policy decisions and failure of cooperation among the MOFE, the FSC, and the FSS. The board points out among other things that (1) with the cooperation of the FSC, the MOFE made a policy decision to stimulate the economy by encouraging the public to use their credit cards and extend their credit lines; and (2) afterwards the FSC and the FSS requested the MOFE to reduce the cash service lines through legislation, but the request was rejected by the MOFE, which preferred the recovery of public spending. The board diagnosed that the failure is partly due to the MOFE's conflicting responsibilities—that is, the responsibility for economic policy and that for financial legislation. Whenever the two responsibilities conflict, the MOFE tended to sacrifice the latter. The board suggested that the legislative power of the MOFE be transferred to the FSC.

Many commentators agree with the board's suggestion of depriving the MOFE of legislative powers, but they differ in their opinion about "to whom the power is to be vested." They prefer strengthening of the private body, FSS, rather than the governmental body, FSC. I am inclined to agree with many commentators. But, this in turn will be possible if and only if the FSS merges with the FSC and is filled with efficient personnel with special expertise. The most important thing at this stage is therefore to cement *new* culture through *cross-fertilization* of ideas, not only between sectoral divisions in the FSS but between the public servant-filled FSC and the private staff-filled FSS. It will be more desirable to encourage staff to move around between private and public sectors generally, creating new market-friendly cultures.

Conflicting Responsibilities of the Regulators

As the responsibilities in the MOFE as the economic policy maker and the financial policy maker conflict, so do the responsibilities in the FSC as the prudential regulator and the restructuring authority. As the author points out, there must have been real efficiencies for the FSC in bringing together both responsibilities at the height of the crisis, and it is common for the FSC to have views on and play a part in the restructuring of the financial

sector. But now that things are more normal, there must be an argument for greater separation of the activities of regulation and restructuring. This matter is closely related to the future of the secretariat in the FSC. I personally prefer that the restructuring functions of the FSC be transferred to the KDIC and the MOFE. But even in this case, the difficult questions of whether and to what extent the KDIC is to be independent from the MOFE influence have to be answered.

The Status of the SFC and the Bank of Korea

The Securities and Futures Commission is a statutory subcommittee “within” the FSC and in charge of more specialized securities matters. It seems therefore not irrational to retain both the FSC and the SFC, as long as their roles are well defined.

Under the current regime, it is least likely for the Bank of Korea to interfere in financial regulation. The only statutory power allowed the bank is to ask the FSS either to investigate financial institutions on its behalf or to coinvestigate the institutions with the bank staffs. In practice, the FSS seems to be less willing to comply with the request.

Questions

As the author points out, the consolidation of different regulators is a big issue, and that is true in Korea. But the most pressing issue in Korea is currently the consolidation of over twenty institutional statutes. I'd like to know how the process of legislative consolidation proceeded in the UK. In particular, where there is inconsistency between different institutional acts, the difficult question of “selection for default rules” is emerging, and once a selection is made the reason for such selection needs to be explained. Is there any guidance for the selection of default rules in the preparation of the FSMA? In Korea, for example, in respect of the COB regulation, we are adopting the “strongest rule” approach with exemptions: The COB rules in securities regulation are to be adopted as the default rules, which will also be applied to banks and insurance firms, but with many exemptions.

But in some cases, the exemption is not to be allowed from a fairness point of view, which may trigger resistance from those who had been regulated with a softer touch. As the author points out, the UK insurance industry had been regulated weakly, where particular legal power had either not been used or had been interpreted in a narrow way. Is there any resistance from the insurance industry to the introduction of beefed-up enforcement by the new legislation?

The introduction of default rules for prudential regulation is a more difficult issue, given that the prudential method used in banking and securities regulation is different from that used in insurance regulation. I'd like to know how the FSA is developing a common default rule for prudential regulation that will be applicable to all three areas comfortably.

In Korea, *chaebol* issues are always hotly debated. One issue is the separation of the financial capital from the *chaebol* capital. In this sense, the control regime in Part XII in the FSMA deriving from the old Banking Act is relevant. I'd like to know whether there is a real case of objections to the acquisition of bank shares or a case of ordering disposition of existing shareholdings on the ground that the acquirer or the existing shareholder is not fit and proper, or that the acquisition or the existing shareholding is against the consumer benefits.

Comments

Sung-In Jun

Summary of the Essay

Professor Jackson's essay tries to explain why the organizational forms of financial supervisory bodies of the United States and the United Kingdom are so different, given that they both share the so-called common law tradition. The U.S. financial regulatory system is notorious for its decentralized and overlapped features, whereas the UK system has been successfully consolidated from its equally diversified legacy.

Professor Jackson first identifies the much-discussed "political economy" aspects of financial reforms under the headings of Parliamentary System of Government, Acquiescence of Muddling Through, the Role of European Institutions, and the Local Political Considerations. Some aspects are quite intuitive and hence have been fairly thoroughly discussed by others, while the Role of European Institutions is rather a newcomer in the debate.

Professor Jackson then proceeds to seek other factors that can shed some light on the observed system differences. The factors newly identified are differences in regulatory objectives and differences in regulatory intensity. Professor Jackson argues that in the UK, the main objective of financial regulation is market stability, and other objectives such as protecting depositors and investors are pursued only after cost calculations justify it. In the United States, Professor Jackson argues, the protection of depositors and investors is the most important objective, which is usually pursued in the absence of cost calculations. It is argued that the differences in the regulatory objectives contribute to the divergence of structural differences in the sense that the emphasis on market integrity facilitated system consolidation in the UK, while consumer protection in various areas of financial transaction made the consolidation difficult in the United States.

In the latter part of the essay, Professor Jackson presents some numerical evidence on the differences in the regulatory intensity between the two countries and also among other "civil law" countries. The data shows that the regulatory intensity of the United States, measured by the size of the budget or by the numbers of personnel in absolute or normalized terms, is much higher than that of the UK. Also, cross-sectional comparison shows that in general, common law countries put considerably more resources on financial regulation than civil law countries.

Questions and Comments

Professor Jackson's essay is very informative and carefully written, well balanced between institutional and empirical aspects of the issue. Several questions and comments are in order.

The Relevance of the "Jackson Hypothesis"

The essay proposes an important hypothesis that "as the degree of regulatory intensity increases, consolidation of regulatory functions becomes more cumbersome and difficult to achieve." The hypothesis appears to make sense in that financial regulatory bodies constrained by the cost-sensitive mandate tend to exhibit low regulatory intensity, and one might also agree on consolidation if there are economies of scale or scope. In this case, we do observe low intensity coupled with consolidated supervision, both driven by cost sensitiveness. It is not clear, however, why low regulatory intensity itself tends to cause consolidation. At least in theory, one may think of a situation where a much fragmented regulatory system run by unskilled and poorly motivated personnel, whose main interests lie elsewhere for good or for bad, results in low regulatory intensity. In this case, consolidating the regulatory bodies and putting skilled and highly motivated specialists into the system may dramatically improve regulatory intensity.¹

Empirical evidence on this seems to be mixed. It is true that the U.S. system shows high regulatory intensity and highly fragmented institutions, as predicted. The UK, which boasts of relatively high regulatory intensity compared to other countries after the appropriate normalization, has a thoroughly consolidated system. Australia, whose intensity is as high as or close to the UK depending on the normalization, has a bifurcated system, the familiar "twin peaks." It is fair to say that more information is needed to accept or reject the hypothesis.

Regulatory Intensity vs. Regulatory Efficiency

In the latter part of the essay, Professor Jackson performs and cites several empirical studies in order to measure the size of regulatory intensity among selected countries, including the United States and the UK. Empirical works are mostly concentrated on measuring the size of input—for example, the size of budget and the number of personnel, even if output measures such as enforcement figures are also presented.²

Without the knowledge or the assumption of regulatory efficiency, the concept of regulatory intensity does not carry us too far. First, without assumption of efficiency, measuring the size of input does not automatically give us the degree of regulatory intensity, since input can be wasted away. It is true that the output measures such as enforcement figures presented in Figure 2.8 indeed give us the extent of regulatory intensity. However, it has to be emphasized that output measures for intensity are them-

selves input measures for efficiency, whose output measures are typically (the lack of) the frequency of financial scandals, the cost of bailing out failing financial institutions, or foregone wealth of investors due to security fraud.³ In other words, regulatory efficiency means how successful the system is to achieve whatever policy objectives imposed upon it. In this sense the efficiency concept is a bridge that can connect the empirical analysis of the third section of the essay to the second, where various policy objectives are discussed.

The Dilemma of Korea Since 1997

The case of Korea provides an interesting “side evidence” (meaning evidence lying somewhere between proof and counterexample) to the Jackson Hypothesis and hence is briefly discussed here. Up to 1997, the task of financial supervision was performed by two institutions—the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of Finance—where the former assumed banking supervision and the latter assumed the rest. Usually, the ministry delegated its supervisory power to several public (but nongovernmental) supervisory boards, due to limited resources and manpower. The ministry, however, did use its power from time to time in order to pursue other nonfinancial goals such as government-led business restructuring. So the system was consolidated formally but highly fragmented practically, and it was also plagued by a suboptimal degree of supervision due to lack of incentives.

At the dawn of 1997, the Financial Reform Committee was organized and discussed various ways of consolidating diversified supervisory bodies into one. Even if the committee managed to come up with a proposal, the actual reform movement did not go very far due to fierce opposition by the related parties.⁴ It was the foreign currency crisis at the end of 1997 that made the move toward financial reform imperative. Finally, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), as a consolidated financial supervisory body composed of private specialists, began to function as of April 1, 1998.

The financial reform of Korea was partially influenced by the experience of the UK and hence shared some similarities. The consolidated supervisory system is the most prominent example. The fact that the supervision was performed by private specialists is another. Among these two, what is more important and worth noting is the latter. Traditionally, the government used its supervisory power as a handy tool to intervene in the financial market in order to pursue nonfinancial goals. With the introduction of the new system, the channel is blocked—at least partially. As for the importance of consolidation, there is not much to say since functional supervision, which is the very premise of consolidation, in its true meaning has not been introduced yet. The current situation is like many regulatory bodies living together in one big house. This is why there is vir-

tually no retroactive movement against consolidation per se, but endless attack by the Ministry of Finance in order to restore the old regime, where it had a much larger role. The case of Korea shows that sometimes movement toward consolidation has other motives or effects in addition to just extracting economies of scope.

Notes

1. It would be interesting to check what the British system before the consolidation looked like in this regard. Though it may not be true that the supervision, if there was any, was managed by unskilled personnel, the system was indeed fragmented and had some blind spots. Several important financial scandals serve as undeniable evidence for the poor regulatory intensity of the time.
2. See Figure 2.8 of the essay.
3. Having identified both input and output measures, one can easily calculate, at least theoretically, the degree of (or the lack of) regulatory efficiency by calculating the ratio of the economic cost of financial scandals to the size of budget, for example.
4. The Jackson Hypothesis does not seem to apply here since the degree of regulatory intensity was very low before the consolidation, and also there was no mention of cost-sensitive supervision either before or after the consolidation.